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Abstract 
 
We use a sample of 964 executive directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed firms to 
examine linkage between firm performance and cash-based bonus payments. As a pooled OLS 
regression model may hide different models that characterize subsets of observations we use latent 
class analysis to further examine the data and to identify more specifically the influence of corporate 
governance features. Our latent class analysis results indicate that remuneration committees with 
members having their interests better aligned with shareholders (such as presence of a significant 
owner) appear more likely to consider the incremental value of tying executive director 
compensation to intellectual capital performance. Remuneration committees with a lower risk of 
influence from managerial power were also found to be more likely to support a compensation 
linkage for executive directors to intellectual capital performance. The influence of the 
remuneration committee features is evident for both entrepreneurial and traditional firms. Overall, 
our findings are consistent with both the optimal-contract pricing and managerial power views of 
executive compensation setting.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the wake of the corporate scandals that plague 
developed economies at the turn of the millennium 
there is renewed concern and debate on how best to 
align the interests of corporate executives with 
shareholders. During the 1980s and 1990s there was 
a steady growth in the use of stock options. This 
technique was particular evident amongst “new 
economy” and entrepreneurial firms. The preceding 
bursting of the “Internet Bubble” has renewed calls 
a scaling back on the use of options in favor of more 
traditional cash-based incentives. With a refreshed 
emphasis on cash-based incentives and calls for the 
development of alternative compensation 
mechanisms, it is an opportune time to determine if 
measures of the pivotal driver of value creation – 
namely intellectual capital - in the new economic 
age can provide guidance. This is particular true for 
entrepreneurial firms that are primarily not based on 
fixed assets but intangible elements. Cash-based 
incentives play an important role in the 
compensation packages of executive in Singapore; 
thus, this domestic setting provides an opportune 
environment for analyzing the influence of 
remuneration committee composition. 
The purpose our study is to examine the 
association between intellectual capital performance 
and the cash-based bonus payments to executive 
directors. We further extend the analysis to 
determine the potential mitigating or contributing 
influence of corporate governance features. Our 
analysis is based on a sample of 964 executive 
directors representing 354 Singapore publicly listed 
firms. Data on executive director remuneration and 
intellectual capital performance is based 
information collected for the 2003 fiscal year. Using 
a pooled sample we find that intellectual capital 
performance is not significantly associated with the 
level of cash-based bonuses paid to Singapore 
executive directors. Using latent class mixture 
models to identify clusters with a homogenous 
regression structure reveals, however, that 21.7% 
(11.2%) of the sample have a positive (negative) 
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association between intellectual capital performance 
and the level of cash-based bonus payments. The 
latent class analysis indicates that the positive 
(negative) association is evident with a corporate 
governance structure in effect is strong (poor). 
Traditionally, firms have relied on accounting 
metrics – such as earnings, return on asset or 
investments – when rewarding corporate 
management. Some recent evidence, however, 
suggests a growing number of firms are increasingly 
turning to non-financial performance metrics when 
negotiating compensation contracts with corporate 
management (e.g., Ittner et al., 1997; Banker et al., 
2000). The growing disparity between a firm’s 
market and book values is likely to be a significant 
contributing factor for growing emphasis on use of 
non-financial performance measures in rewarding 
corporate management. There is a growing 
discontent that in the new economic age in which 
intellectual rather than physical capital is the pivotal 
force behind value creation the traditional 
accounting model can no longer accurately picture 
firm performance. Cast in this light it has been 
suggested non-financial performance measures are 
becoming increasingly important as predictors of 
future firm performance providing incremental 
information above that of traditional accounting 
based metrics (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Lipe 
and Salterio, 2000; Libby et al., 2004). 
During the 1990s stock prices were 
increasingly used in executive compensation 
contracts (Murphy, 1999). Growth in stock price use 
in compensation arrangements stemmed from the 
perception they capture both current and future 
actions of executives. The stock price is viewed as a 
statistic that sufficiently covers both accounting and 
non-financial issues. Agency theory advocates, 
however, argue that whilst accounting and non-
accounting metrics may be impounded in the stock 
price these measures will complement stock prices 
when compensating executives (e.g., Feltham and 
Xie, 1994). Some previous research finds 
accounting numbers provide incremental 
information to market-based measures in executive 
compensation contracts (e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 
1987; Sloan, 1993). Meanwhile, few studies 
examine the economic value of non-performance 
metrics in executive compensation packages (e.g., 
Ittner et al., 1997; Davila and Ventratachalam, 
2001). 
Our paper diverges from the prior extant 
financial/non-financial – performance literature by 
defining firm performance in terms of intellectual 
capital contributions. Whilst previous studies 
looking at the non-financial performance – 
executive compensation linkage may have used a 
metric that is intellectual capital in nature these 
metrics generally only capture a single element of 
the intellectual capital jigsaw. We adopt a more 
holistic metric of intellectual capital in an effort to 
better determine if this pivotal driving force behind 
present and future wealth creation is currently being 
reflected cash-based bonus payments to executive 
directors. We focus on cash-based bonus payments 
rather than total compensation as we consider the 
incentive components of an executive director’s 
remuneration will best reflect their efforts in truly 
using all assets at their disposal in an effective and 
efficient manner (endnote 1). Our study focuses on 
intellectual capital because whilst practitioners and 
scholars increasing recognize its significance no 
study to our knowledge as attended to analyze 
directly the performance of this class of asset with 
executive remuneration. Our study contributes to 
the intellectual capital literature by pursuing an 
alternative avenue then previous taken within this 
field. In general intellectual capital research has 
concentrated on two major streams of investigation. 
There have been recent calls for more expansive 
empirical research into alternative areas of interest 
so as to broaden understanding of the intellectual 
capital discipline (e.g., Bukh et al., 2005). Our study 
is motivated, in part, by these calls. Finally, while 
other firm performance – executive compensation 
studies have considered the influence of corporate 
governance features we supplement our analysis by 
using latent analysis. Prior related research has 
relied primarily on OLS regressions with analysis 
built on the presumption that one structural model is 
appropriate for the entire sample. However, if 
alternative models characterize subsets of 
observations the pooled estimation results can be 
highly misleading. To supplement our pooled 
analysis we classify the sample into homogenous 
clusters to determine distinguishing corporate 
governance features affecting the intellectual capital 
performance – executive director compensation 
association. 
The paper proceeds in the following manner. 
The next section develops our hypothesis and 
discusses the related research. Section 3 describes 
the research method used to test our hypothesis 
including the sample and variable proxies. Section 4 
presents our primary pooled sample results followed 
in the next section by latent analysis findings. In 
Section 6 we discuss our conclusions, and the 
limitations of our study and ideas for future 
research. 
 
Section 2. Hypotheses Development and 
Related Research 
 
Intellectual Capital Performance and 
Executive Director Remuneration 
 
Interest in executive compensation amongst 
financial economists has a lengthy and pronounced 
history. Indeed, the increase in academic enquiries 
into the subject of CEO compensation throughout 
the 1990s appeared to virtually outpace the dramatic 
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increases in CEO pay during this time (Murphy, 
1999). Apart from the growth in the magnitude of 
executive compensation worldwide, there has been 
an economically significant evolution toward a 
greater proportion of pay being awarded on a 
performance basis (e.g., Byrd et al., 1998; Harvey 
and Shrieves, 2000) (endnote 2). The recent spate of 
corporate scandal merely serves to renew 
international interest and debate in the magnitude 
and type of executive remuneration (Ryan and 
Wiggins, 2004). Questions have recently been 
raised by popular literature commentators, corporate 
governance reformists, policymakers and some 
academics about the validity of rewarding executive 
directors primarily in the form of equity-based 
incentives based on a firm’s stock performance. For 
example, it is suggested a concentration on stock 
prices may serve as an incentive for corporate 
management to develop strategies and policies that 
may boost stock prices but are detrimental to the 
other key elements of the firm’s operations. 
Stock prices can be perceived as an aggregate 
measure of the firm’s future value after impounding 
all existing public information. Thus, performance 
based on stock prices can be viewed as an aggregate 
and sufficient statistic for more specific financial 
and non-financial metrics. Several theoretical 
arguments, however, have been forwarded to 
explain why stock price based measure for 
rewarding executives should be supplemented with 
other performance measures. The first stems from 
the congruency of stock prices (Datar et al., 2001). 
Feltham and Xie (1994) show that whilst stock 
prices are an aggregate of all existing public 
information they may not do so in a way that is not 
congruent with the weights required on the various 
signals from a contracting perspective. Put 
otherwise, weights on different signals that are 
implicit in determining the stock price is established 
with firm valuation as the objective rather that for 
assessing the performance of executives. Thus, 
“price is not necessarily, nor even likely to be, a 
perfectly congruent performance measure” (Feltham 
and Xie, 1994, p.447). If stock prices are not 
congruent with intended actions and decisions of 
executive then additional performance measures 
should be included in executives contracting 
process. 
If one relaxes the view stock prices are efficient 
aggregators of publicly available information it is 
argued various other metrics – such as intellectual 
capital performance – should be used to supplement 
stock prices when rewarding executives so as to 
better determine an executives trading incentives 
(e.g., Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993; Kim and Suh, 
1993; Feltham and Wu, 1999). Specifically, 
relaxing the constraint that a stock price is an 
effective public information aggregator will better 
enable the executive to make trade-offs during the 
contracting negotiating process by allowing 
alternative performance measures to be introduced 
during contracting (Bainman and Verrechia, 1995). 
The underlying properties of intellectual capital 
are generally described as being intangible in nature 
and difficult to formally measure. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to suggest measures of intellectual capital 
are more likely to be affiliated with non-financial 
measures than financial accounting and stock price 
measures. Few studies have formally investigated 
the association between non-financial performance 
measures and remuneration contracts. Ittner et al., 
(1997) provide initial ground breaking research 
using data from proxy statements on CEO bonus 
contracts to provide evidence on the determinants of 
relative weights on non-financial performance 
measures. They (Ittner et al., 1997) found 
companies following an innovation-oriented 
strategy, or when stock price based performance 
measures were less noisy, put more weight on non-
financial measures in determining CEO bonuses. A 
key limitation of the study by Ittner et al., (1997), 
however, is disclosure of compensation contracts in 
proxy statements (documentation form used) are 
quite limited meaning firms not disclosing specific 
weights to financial and non-financial performance 
measures were excluded. Consequently, Ittner et al., 
(1997) may have excluded a number of firms from 
their sample that actual use non-financial 
performance measures but did not disclose the fact 
explicitly. Davila and Venkatachalam (2001) sought 
to overcome this limitation by examining the 
association between a specific non-financial 
performance measure (i.e., web traffic) deemed 
important to firms in Internet industry and CEO 
total compensation and the total change in CEO 
wealth. They (Davila and Venkatachalam, 2001) 
report a positive association suggesting non-
financial performance measures provide incremental 
information about the actions of CEOs above that 
provided by financial (accounting and stock) 
measures. Davila and Venkatachalam (2001) also 
show the association between non-financial 
performance and CEO compensation is influenced 
by a CEO’s power. By focusing on a single industry 
sector and non-performance measure Davila and 
Venkatachalam (2001) acknowledge there is some 
question about the ability to extend their findings 
more broadly. 
Whilst the extant literature on the association 
between non-financial performance measures and 
executive compensation is rather thin, and empirical 
findings potentially questionable these studies do 
provide initial guidance on the possible association 
between intellectual capital performance and 
executive remuneration. Specifically, given the 
focus of our study, we propose intellectual capital 
performance metrics a likely to have a possible 
incremental value above that of traditional 
accounting and stock based performance measures. 
We examine this proposition by seeking to 
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determine whether cash-based bonus payments to 
executive director vary just as if the executive 
director is being evaluated based on intellectual 
capital performance measures (endnote 3). 
 
3. Research Method 
 
We infer the use and economic importance of 
intellectual capital related performance metric in 
compensation contracts by examining the cross-
sectional association between the ratio of cash-
based bonus payments to total non-contingent 
remuneration, and a composite measure of 
intellectual capital performance. 
 
Proxy Measure for Dependent Variable 
 
Prior to the CGC (2001) coming into effect on 1 
January 2003 disclosure requirements on the 
compensation of executive directors and top 
management was limited. Specifically, firms were 
only required to disclose the remuneration of 
directors in three $250,000 bands (endnote 4). 
Whilst compensation disclosures have increased 
since the introduction of the CGC the nature and 
extent still lags behind that in major developed 
economies like the United States, United Kingdom 
and Australia. Annual report compensation 
disclosure requirement do not provide standardized 
categorization of compensation components. In their 
2003 annual reports Singapore firms typically 
categorized compensation components as: (1) 
salary; (2) director’s fee; (3) bonuses; (4) 
allowances/fringe benefits; and (5) others. For the 
majority of firms (more than 90% listed on SGX) 
disclosure of compensation components was 
expressed in percentages rather than actual dollar 
amounts. Disclosure of stock option information 
was usually not included as a direct aspect of a 
director’s compensation being reported in 
alternative sections. Also, during 2003 few 
companies issued stock options suggesting equity-
incentive compensation is not as popular relative to 
United States firms. As it is our intent to focus on 
incentive payment we limit our analysis to cash-
based incentives, specifically the amount of bonus 
compensation paid (endnote 5). With this in mind 
our proxy (hereafter Prop_Incentive_Pay) is defined 
as the ratio of cash-based bonus payments made to 
executive director j as disclosed by Singapore firm k 
in their 2003 annual reports to total non-contingent 
salary payments (endnote 6). 
 
Proxy Measure for Intellectual Capital 
Performance 
 
One of the two major research streams within the 
intellectual capital discipline has concentrated on 
developing measures of intellectual capital 
performance. Whilst a number of metrics have been 
proposed there as yet a lack of consensus on any 
one specific approach (see Bontis, 2001, 2003 for a 
comprehensive review of the major intellectual 
capital performance measures developed). 
Intellectual capital researchers have identified a 
number of key indicators that can be used in the 
construction of a comprehensive measure of 
intellectual capital performance. Ideally an 
examination of the explicit use of intellectual capital 
indicators in compensation contracts would best 
meet the objectives of our study. Data unavailability 
on which indicators firms precisely use, and the 
weights applied to these indicators restricts our 
ability to conduct an explicit analysis. Our selection 
of an intellectual capital metric is also restricted by 
a general lack of disclosure that restricts our ability 
to focus on specific indicators. As we wish to 
capture remuneration and intellectual capital details 
from as many firms across the Singapore capital 
market as possible we decided to use a composite 
intellectual capital metric that is based on 
information routinely reported in annual reports. 
Specifically, for this analysis we use the intellectual 
capital efficiency coefficient (ICE) based on the 
Value Added Intellectual Coefficient™ (VAIC™) 
methodology developed by Ante Pulic (1998). 
VAIC™ is an analytical procedure designed to 
enable management, shareholders and other relevant 
stakeholders to effectively monitor and evaluate the 
efficiency of VA by a firm’s total resources and each 
major resource component. Formally, VAIC™ is a 
composite sum of three indicators formally termed: 
(1) Capital Employed Efficiency (CEE) – indicator 
of VA efficiency of capital employed; (2) Human 
Capital Efficienca (HCE) – indicator of VA 
efficiency of human capital; and (3) Structural 
Capital Efficiency (SCE) – indicator of VA 
efficiency of structural capital. Equation (1) 
formalizes the VAIC™ relationship algebraically:  
VAIC™i = CEEi + HCEi + SCEi [Equation (1)] 
Where: 
VAIC™i = VA intellectual coefficient for 
company i; 
CEEi  = VA capital employed coefficient for 
company i; 
HCEi = human capital coefficient for 
company i; and 
SCEi = structural capital VA for company i. 
Pulic (1998) states the higher the VAIC™ 
coefficient, the better the efficiency of VA by a 
firm’s total resources. The first step in calculating 
CEE, HCE and SCE is to determine a firm’s total 
VA. This calculation is defined by the following 
algebraic equation: 
VAi = Ii + DPi + Di + Ti + Mi + Ri  (endnote 7) 
[Equation (2)] 
Where: VA for firm i computed as the sum of 
interest expenses (Ii); depreciation expenses 
(DPi); dividends (Di); corporate taxes (Ti); 
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equity of minority shareholders in net income 
of subsidiaries (Mi); profits retained for the 
year (Ri) and Salaries and Wages (HC). 
Pulic (1998) stated CEE is the ratio of total VA 
divided by the total amount of capital employed 
(CE) where capital employed is defined as the book 
value of a firm’s net assets. Equation (4) presents 
the CEE relationship algebraically: 
CEEi = VAi/CEi [Equation (3)] 
Where: CEEi = capital employed efficiency 
coefficient for company i;  
VAi = VA for firm i (see formal definition 
above); and 
CAi = book value of the net assets for firm i. 
Consistent with views of other leading IC 
authorities (e.g., Edvinsson, 1997; Sveiby, 2001), 
Pulic (1998) argues total salary and wage costs are 
an indicator of a firm’s human capital (HC). HCE, 
therefore, is calculated as the ratio of total VA 
divided by the total salary and wages spent by the 
firm on it employees. Equation (4) shows this 
relationship algebraically: 
HCEi = VAi/HCi [Equation (4)] 
Where: HCEi = human capital efficiency 
coefficient for company i; 
VAi = VA for firm i (see formal definition 
above); and 
HCi = total investment salary and wage for 
firm i. 
In order to calculate SCE, it is first necessary to 
determine the value of a firm’s structural capital 
(SC). Pulic (1998) proposes a firm’s total VA less its 
human capital is an appropriate proxy of a firm’s 
SC. That is: 
SCi = VAi – HCi [Equation (5)] 
Where: 
SCi = Structural capital for company i; 
VAi = VA for firm i (see formal definition 
above); and 
HCi = total salary and wage costs for firm i. 
Based on prior empirical research findings, 
Pulic (1998) argues there is a proportionate inverse 
relationship between HC and SC in the value 
creation process attributable to the entire IC base 
(endnote 8). Consequently, Pulic (1998) argues the 
formula for calculating SCE differed to that for CEE 
and HCE respectively. Specifically, Pulic (1998) 
stated SCE is the ratio of a firm’s SC divided by the 
total VA. This relationship is shown in Equation (6): 
SCEi = SCi / VAi [Equation (6)] 
Where: 
SCEi = structural capital efficiency 
coefficient for company i; 
SCi = Structural capital for company i; and 
VAi = VA for firm i (see formal definition 
above). 
ICE is the sum of human capital efficiency and 
structural capital efficiency coefficients. Apart from 
points raised above, several other reasons justify the 
selection of ICE as the measure of intellectual 
capital. First, ICE provides a standardized and 
consistent basis of measure. This better enables us 
to conduct of an analysis of a large sample of firms 
across various industrial sectors. Second, all data 
used in the calculation of ICE is based on audited 
information. Thus, calculations can be considered 
objective and verifiable. Other intellectual capital 
metrics have been criticized for allowing possible 
subjectivity into the determination of underlying 
indicators using information that cannot be readily 
verified. Third, ICE is a straightforward technique 
that enhances cognitive understanding and enables 
ease of calculation by various internal and external 
stakeholders. Alternative intellectual capital metrics, 
whilst providing valuable insights are limited as 
they can only be calculated by internal parties, or 
rely upon sophisticated models, analysis and 
principals. Finally, methodology underlying ICE 
has been the subject of prior empirical research and 
been applied previously by firms (e.g., Williams, 
2001; Ho and Williams, 2003). 
 
Corporate Governance Measures 
 
As noted earlier the primary focus of our study is to 
analyze the cash-based bonus – intellectual capital 
performance linkage. Prior executive compensation 
literature, however, suggests that whilst incentive 
based remunerations are likely to assist in aligning 
the interest of corporate management with those of 
shareholders, corporate governance features will 
likely have a bearing on the incorporation of such 
incentives into remuneration packages for 
executives. Further, corporate governance features 
may also influence corporate performance. Mehran 
(1995), for example, finds boards of directors with a 
higher proportion of inside directors were less likely 
to link executive remuneration with incentive 
measures, and this led to lower firm performance. 
Meanwhile, Core et al., (1999) show that firms with 
a weak corporate governance structure were 
associated with higher CEO compensation and low 
firm performance. With these points in mind our 
analysis is extended to determine how corporate 
governance features may influence the association 
between cash-based bonus payments and 
intellectual capital performance. 
Prior research has generally concentrated on the 
influence of board of director features on executive 
compensation when addressing corporate 
governance concerns. Increasingly the responsibility 
for reviewing, developing and recommending 
remuneration arrangements for executives is being 
delegated to remuneration committees. Indeed, in 
Singapore all publicly listed firms are now required 
to establish a remuneration committee to undertake 
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remuneration responsibilities. Consequently, we 
focus corporate governance features pertaining to 
the remuneration committee rather than the board of 
directors specifically. The extant literature has 
typically examined compensation decisions from 
the perspective a board of directors/remuneration 
committee wishes to establish an optimal contract to 
mitigate agency conflicts (Ryan and Wiggins, 
2004). A growing body of literature, however, 
suggests the compensation process will also depend 
upon the influence of managerial power over the 
board of directors/remuneration committee (e.g., 
Bebchuk et al., 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991). It is not the purpose of this study to rectify 
differences between the optimal contract pricing and 
managerial power models. Rather, following 
Conyon and He (2004) we use a joint framework 
(endnote 9) to select variables representative of each 
model; specifically, three for the optimal contract 
pricing model and four for the managerial power 
model. Each respective remuneration committee 
feature and the relevant proxy is described as 
follows. We use a dichotomous scale to measure the 
presence of a significant shareholder on the 
remuneration committee (hereafter SignOwner). 
Specifically, firms with a remuneration committee 
member owning five percent or more common 
outstanding shares are scored one, otherwise zero. A 
dichotomous scale is also used to measure 
‘subcommittee’ composition (hereafter AllSame). 
That is, firms with the membership of the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees being the 
same individuals being scored a one, otherwise 
zero. The influence of a member having an 
accounting or legal education and work background 
on the decision making process of the remuneration 
committee is captured by the proxy RCAccLegal. 
This proxy is the proportion of remuneration 
committee of members with an accounting or legal 
education and work background. The 
conscientiousness of the remuneration committee 
(hereafter RCDiligence) is measured as the total 
number of meetings held by the subcommittee 
during firm i’s 2003 fiscal year. RC_Independence 
is measured as the proportion of inside directors 
(defined as executive directors, non-executive 
directors originally employed by firm i and 
founding members of firm i) to total remuneration 
committee membership. This proxy is designed to 
capture the possible influence on the level of cash-
based incentive payment recommended by the 
remuneration committee of having executive 
directors directly involved in the decision-making 
process. The influence of the presence of senior 
executive directors (defined as executive chairman, 
chief executive officers or managing directors) from 
other firms sitting on the remuneration committee of 
firm i (hereafter Snr_Exe_Presence) is measured as 
the proportion of the remuneration committee 
comprised of senior executive directors from other 
firms. Finally, the number of individuals sitting on 
the remuneration committee of firm i is used to 
proxy for the possible influence of committee size. 
This proxy is terms RCSize. 
 
Basic Econometric Model: Pooled Cross-
Section OLS Regression Analysis Model 
 
Consistent with the majority of prior literature we 
use a pooled-sample cross-sectional ordinary least 
square regression model to estimate the association 
between intellectual capital performance and cash-
based bonus payments to Singapore executive 
directors. The basic model is defined as follows: 
Prop_Incentive_Payi = ai + λi1ICEi + αi1Tenurei + 
αi2Founderi + αi3Familyi + αi4BoD_Sizei + 
αi5BoD_Independencei + αi6Dualityi + 
αi7%_Exe_Dir_Owni + αi8GLCi + αi9OwnCon%i + 
αi10Big-4i + αi11Ln(Aud_Tenure)i + αi12AbsDACi + 
αi13Ln(TotalAssets)i + αi14Ln(Age)i + αi15ROIi + 
αi16Lossesi + αi17Leveragei + αi18MVTotalAssetsi + 
αi19Ln(No. Employees)i + αi20IndMani + 
βi1SignOwneri + βi2AllSamei + βi3RCAccLegali + 
βi4RCDiligencei + βi5RC_Independencei + 
βi6Snr_Exe_Presencei + βi7RCSizei + εi [Equation 
(7)] 
Apart from the dependent, independent and 
corporate governance features already described, we 
also include six groups of control variables in our 
regression analysis. The first group comprises three 
executive director features: (1) tenure of the 
executive director (Tenure); (2) designation of the 
executive director as a founder of the firm 
(Founder); and (3) immediate family member of 
founding family (Family). Inclusion of these 
variables are consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Core and Guay, 1999; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1989; Conyon and He, 2004). Our second set of 
control variables focus on the possible 
compounding influence of board of director 
features. Factors covered are the size of the board 
(BoD_Size), independence level (BoD_ 
Independence), percentage of common outstanding 
shares owned by inside directors (%_Exe_Owners) 
and combined roles of chairperson and chief 
executive director (endnote 10) (Duality) (e.g., 
Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Gul et al., 2003; 
Conyon and Peck, 1998). Our third batch of control 
variables addresses specific features of the 
Singapore capital market. Specifically, the 
government is a major investor in the Singapore 
capital market. We use an indicator variable 
(hereafter GLC) where firm i is scored one if a 
government-linked organization (endnote 11), 
otherwise zero. As ownership concentration is 
considerably high amongst Singapore publicly 
traded firms (endnote 12) we control for this point 
using the proportion of common outstanding shares 
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held by the top 20 shareholders. As this topic is 
interlinked with corporate governance concerns we 
include several variables to control for corporate 
governance features. These are: (1) type of auditor 
(Big-4); (2) tenure of auditor (Ln(Aud-Tenure)); and 
(3) absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals 
(AbsDAC). The fifth group of control variables 
reflects a firm’s economic characteristics. Factors 
included in this group are firm size 
(Ln(TotalAssets)), age of the firm (Ln(Age)), 
financial position (Leverage) and growth 
opportunities (MVTotalAssets). We also include an 
indicator variable (IndMan) to control for industry 
type. Finally, consistent with the extant literature we 
include three financial performance measures: (1) 
stock return (StockRet); (2) accounting return on 
assets (ROA); and (3) financial losses (Losses). 
StockRet is defined as one plus the holding period 
return of the stock for the 2003 fiscal period. ROA is 
measured as the income before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets as reported in the 2003 annual 
report of each firm. Finally, Losses is a dichotomous 
variable where a firm is scored one if it recorded a 
financial loss during the 2001 – 2003 period; 
otherwise the firm is scored zero. Table 1 
summarized formally the dependent, independent, 
corporate governance and control variables. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Alternative Econometric Approach: 
Latent Analysis 
 
As noted earlier the most common econometric 
approach adopting in investigations of the 
association between pay incentives and firm 
performance is the use of a single structural model 
to encompass the entire sample. Larcker and 
Richardson (2004, p.638) argue, however, that “if 
different models characterize subsets of 
observations, the pooled estimation results can be 
highly misleading.” Prior research has sought to 
overcome the limitations of a single (pooled) 
regression model by extending them to include 
interaction terms for subsets of interest. Whilst 
interaction terms may provide useful insights into 
the conditional association between intellectual 
capital performance and cash-based performance 
payments, such an approach has a number of 
inherent limitations. For example, a number of 
corporate governance variables of interest exist; 
hence, the any interaction analysis will require the 
development of a large number of interactions in the 
regression model. The resulting interactions will 
virtually produce with a high degree of certainty 
high levels of mutlicollinearity making the 
interpretation of statistical significant for the 
coefficients highly problematic (Yi, 1989; Larcker 
and Richardson, 2004). 
Latent class mixture models do not impose the 
same structure limitations inherent in pooled 
regression models with interaction terms. Rather, 
these models explicitly allow for the possibility that 
there are alternative models linking executive 
compensation payments and firm performance 
(including intellectual capital performance). Larcker 
and Richardson (2004) note that whilst latent 
analysis has a different orientation from pooled 
regression models with interactions, interaction 
structures are merely special cases of latent class 
mixture models. With latent class analysis the 
sample is classified into homogeneous clusters 
comprising observations that appear to follow 
similar regression model paths. Once such clusters 
are identified it is then possible to determine what 
distinguishing features (such as corporate 
governance characteristics) are associated with the 
observations in each respective cluster. Given the 
prior mixed results surrounding the precise 
relationship between executive pay incentives and 
firm performance, a more general approach (i.e., 
latent class analysis as opposed to pooled regression 
analysis with interactions) is an appropriate choice 
when further analyzing the impact of corporate 
governance features on cash-based payment – 
intellectual capital performance linkage. As the sole 
focus of study is not a critique or development of 
latent class analysis we do not provide an in-depth 
discussion on the econometrics underlying this 
statistical technique. For a full description refer to 
DeSarbo and Cron (1988), Wedel and DeSarbo 
(1995) and Larcker and Richardson (2004). Suffice 
to say, however, clusters formed for our analysis is 
based on Equation 8 defined as follows: 
Prop_Incentive_Payij=ai+ λj1ICEj + εj [Equation (8)] 
Where: 
Prop_Incentive_Payij = Proportion of cash-
based payment to executive director i in firm j; 
ICEi = Intellectual capital performance for firm 
j (see formal definition above); 
λj = unknown proportion of the sample 
contained in respective cluster; and 
εj = error term. 
4. Results 
4.1. Sample Selection 
 
Our initial sample population comprised all 551 
firms listed on the two principal listing boards 
(endnote 13) (denoted Mainboard (413) and Sesdaq 
(138) respectively) of the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore as at 31 December, 2003. At the end of 
the 2003 calendar year the total market 
capitalization for all boards (millions) of the SGX 
was SGD$610,694.1 (Mainboard – $383,388.9; 
Sesdaq - $6,079.3; SGX Xtranet - $78,750.5; and 
Clob International - $142,478.4). For this study we 
hand collected information from published 2003 
annual reports to construct the proxy measures for 
the dependent and experimental variables. Of firms 
in the initial sample population 531 produced 2003 
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annual reports (endnote 14). As we focus on 
Singapore incorporated entities listed on the SGX 
we excluded foreign incorporated firms. We then 
eliminated all firms from the finance (this includes 
bank, insurance, unit trusts and finance firms) sector 
as firms is this sector are subject to different 
regulatory requirements that could unduly affect 
firm performance, construction of remuneration 
packages and bonuses paid. To avoid any adverse 
variations in pay due to listing we exclude all 2003 
IPOs from the sample. Following the 
aforementioned exclusions 2003 annual reports 
were sought from 402 firms of which 392 firms 
were collected. Reliable remuneration data could 
not be assessed from eleven annual reports due 
either non- or inadequate disclosure. We also 
eliminated a further twelve firms that had yet to 
establish a remuneration committee. Data to 
construct proxy measures for the control variables 
were obtained directly from collected annual reports 
or where data was unavailable reputable databases 
such as Datastream and Compustat International. 
Nonetheless, we were unable to collect sufficient 
information to construct a full set of proxy measures 
for fourteen entities. Five did not have complete 
corporate governance data the remainder having 
insufficient financial information related 
disclosures. Finally, we exclude three outlier (>4 
standard deviations from the mean absolute 
discretionary accruals) (endnote 15). For purposes 
of statistical analysis, therefore, we are left with a 
final usable sample of 354 firms. Table 2 
summarizes the sample selection process. 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
dependent, independent and control variables. 
Descriptive statistics for characteristics related to 
some dependent, independent and control variables 
are also reported. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
Relative to the United States Singapore 
executive directors appear to receive a significantly 
higher proportion of total remuneration received in 
the form of a non-contingent payment than 
contingent-based payments. Of the sample, total 
remuneration for the majority (42.53%) in 2003 is 
below SDG$250,000 with just over a fifth (21.37%) 
receiving SGD$500,000 or more. The main form of 
remuneration for executive directors of Singapore 
publicly listed firms during 2003 is shown to be 
fixed salaries accounting for nearly three-quarters of 
total compensation. Conversely, only about a fifth 
of an executive director’s total compensation came 
in the form of cash-based bonus incentives. The 
remaining proportion of an executive director’s total 
remuneration was usually received in the form of 
allowance, benefits-in-kind or fringe-benefits.  
Across the remuneration committees covered in 
this study nearly two-thirds (63.24%) had at least 
one member being a substantial shareholder in the 
firm. Also, membership of 23.49 per cent of the 
remuneration committees is precisely the same as 
for the other major subcommittees (audit and 
nomination) of the board of directors. Overall, 
nearly half of the members of the remuneration 
committees surveyed had members with an 
accounting and/or legal education and subsequent 
work related experience. This infers remuneration 
committees of Singapore publicly traded firms are 
likely to have a strong awareness of financial and/or 
fiduciary consequences associated with awarding 
inappropriate remuneration packages. Consistent 
with requirements of The Code (2001) remuneration 
committees have a majority of independent 
directors. The descriptive statistics for 
RC_Independence, however, suggest few 
remuneration committees a comprised solely of 
independent directors. Of outsiders sitting on 
remunerations within the sample only 17.22 per cent 
are senior executive directors (i.e., chairman, chief 
executive officer or managing director) of another 
firm. The size of the remuneration committee also 
appears to comply closely with the minimum size 
requirements as specified by The Code (2001) with 
few remuneration committees comprising more than 
three members. Finally, during the 2003 fiscal year 
the number of meetings held by each remuneration 
committee on average is just over one (1.23). The 
most number of meetings held was five (5) with a 
small number holding no meetings at all. The low 
number of meetings held per remuneration 
committee could imply that in many circumstances 
the committee did not seek to review executive 
directors’ remuneration on a regular periodic basis. 
4.3. Correlation Analysis 
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix between the 
dependent, experimental and corporate governance 
variables (endnote 16). The upper half of each panel 
reports Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients 
(crp), the lower half Spearman correlation 
coefficients (crs). Results provide initial support for 
our presumption of a positive association between 
intellectual capital performance and the ratio of 
cash-based bonus payments to non-contingent 
compensation (p<0.01, crp and crs). Also, 
Prop_Incentive_Pay is negatively significantly 
correlated with Snr_Exe_Presence (p<0.01, crp and 
crs) and RCSize (p<0.05, crp and crs). Meanwhile, 
RCAccLegal (p<0.05, crp), RC_Independence 
(p<0.01, crp and crs) and RCDiligence (p<0.05, crp 
and crs) are positive and significantly correlated 
with the dependent variable. AllSame (p<0.01, crp 
and crs) is also significantly correlated but the 
directional sign is opposite to that expected. Both 
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Pearson and Spearman correlation values between 
Prop_Incentive_Pay and SignOwner are both 
insignificant from zero.  
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
Prop_Incentive_Pay is also significantly 
associated with several of the control variables: (a) 
%_Exe_Owners – negative; p<0.01, crp and crs; (b) 
Duality – positive; p<0.01, crp and crs; (c) 
Ln(Aud_Tenure) – positive; p<0.05, crs; (d) 
Ln(TotalAssets) – positive; p<0.01, crp and crs; (e) 
Ln(Age) – negative; p<0.01, crp and crs; (f) ROI – 
positive; p<0.01, crp and crs; (g) Losses – negative; 
p<0.01, crp and crs; and (e) IndMan – positive; 
p<0.01 crp and crs. Between experimental and 
control variables, and amongst control variables 
themselves, significant correlations exist. The 
highest correlation value is -0.5241 (ROI and 
Losses), which whilst high is below the critical limit 
of 0.8 (endnote 17). Variance inflation factors 
calculated for all experimental and control variables 
in the regression models reported in Tables 5 and 6 
are under 2.9. This further suggests multicollinearity 
is not a major problem in the model estimations 
(Greene, 1999; Hair et al., 1995). 
 
4.4. OLS Pooled-Sample Regression 
Results 
 
Table 5 reports three OLS regression results: (1) 
baseline model (Panel A); (2) baseline model and 
remuneration committee characteristics (Panel B); 
and (3) baseline model with remuneration 
committee characteristics and intellectual capital 
performance measure (Panel C). Of the three OLS 
regressions, the model reported in Panel C explains 
the greatest variation in the dependent variable 
(38.0%) with Panel A the least (34.9%). 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
Whilst univariate correlation results may 
support our initial presumption our pooled-sample 
OLS regression results reported in Table 5 Panel C 
suggests that when other factors are considered in 
conjunction the aforementioned association does not 
appear in question. Specifically, the coefficient on 
ICE is positive but insignificant from zero at 
normally reported levels (i.e., one and five per cent 
significance levels). It is noted, however, that the 
coefficient is moderately significant at the ten per 
cent confidence level. Amongst the remuneration 
committee characteristics there appears support for 
the managerial power model with only marginal 
support the optimal contract pricing model. 
Specifically, contrary to expectations the directional 
sign on the coefficient for SignOwner in Panel B 
and C were negative but the coefficients are 
insignificant from zero. The lack of any influence of 
a significant owner on the remuneration committee 
and level of cash-based bonus payments is 
consistent with Core et al., (1999). They (Core et 
al., 1999) report the percentage of stock ownership 
amongst outside directors did not influence CEO 
compensation. Conversely, Conyon and He (2004) 
find a significant negative association between CEO 
compensation and CEO incentive payments. 
Meanwhile, consistent with expectations the 
directional sign on the coefficients on RCAccLegal 
in Panel B and C were positive. Again, however, the 
coefficients on RCAccLegal are insignificant from 
zero. The lack of an association between accounting 
and/or legal education qualifications and executive 
director bonus payments contradict arguments of 
Beasley and Salterio (2001). They (Beasley and 
Salterio, 2001) suggest accounting and legal 
qualifications are important properties in improving 
the effectiveness of an audit committee. Our 
findings suggest these qualifications do not 
necessarily influence the remuneration committee’s 
effectiveness. Coefficients on AllSame are negative 
and statistically significant at conventional levels in 
Panel B and C (p<0.01). Our result may provide 
some grounds to support a recent recommendation 
of the Higgs Report (2003, A.3.7) that no individual 
director be allowed to sit simultaneously on the 
major subcommittees of a board of directors. 
Coefficients on RCDiligence are positive and 
statistically significant (Panel B and C – p<0.01). 
This result supports the presumption that 
remuneration committees meeting more actively to 
review the compensation of executive directors are 
likely to act more autonomously from management. 
As hypothesized in the extant literature the 
coefficient on Snr_Exe_Presence is negative and 
significant in Panel B and C (p<0.05) respectively. 
Our finding contrast with some previous related 
research (e.g., Daily et al., 1998; Newman and 
Mozes, 1999; Conyon and He, 2004) that do not 
find a significant association between the presence 
of another firm’s senior executive director on the 
firm’s remuneration committee and the 
remuneration of executive directors. Coefficients on 
RC_Independence are also consistent with prior 
predictions being positive and statistically from zero 
(see Panel B (p<0.01) and C (p<0.01) respectively. 
Finally, the coefficients on RC_Size in Panel B and 
C of Table 5 are negative but insignificant from 
zero. As, if suggested by some researchers, diversity 
increases when committee size increases, the lack of 
an association between RC_Size and 
Prop_Incentive_Pay infer remuneration committee 
diversity does not influence the committee’s 
decision making on compensation approaches. 
These findings are consistent with Conyon and He 
(2004). 
 
4.5. Latent Class Analysis Results 
 
The regression model defined by Equation 8 is 
estimated using a latent class mixture approach. The 
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minimum consistent Akaike information criterion 
(CAIC) statistic (not tabulated) results in four latent 
class clusters. Estimation results of Equation 8 for 
each individual cluster is reported in Table 6 Panel 
A. Findings shows for Cluster I (comprising 
30.498% of the sample) the coefficient on ICE is 
positive and significant (p<0.01), whereas for 
Cluster II (composed of 48.755% of the total 
sample) the coefficient on ICE is negative and 
significant (p<0.01). In contrast, the coefficient on 
ICE for Cluster III and IV (9.959% and 10.788% of 
the sample) respectively are positive but 
insignificant from zero. 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Examining Cluster I more closely in relation to 
Panel B findings, we find that firms in the cluster 
having a positive association between intellectual 
capital performance and cash-based bonus payments 
had, relative to the other clusters a: (a) higher 
presence of significant owners on the remuneration 
committee; (b) more active remuneration 
committee; (c) lower proportion of directors on 
remuneration committee with accounting and/or 
legal background; and (d) higher proportion of 
outside directors on the remuneration. Conversely, 
amongst the Cluster II group, having a negative ICE 
- Prop_Incentive_Pay association, the higher 
proportion of remuneration committees having the 
same directors serving on the audit and nomination 
committees were higher than other clusters. In 
addition, firms in Cluster II have a higher presence 
of outside director who concurrently hold senior 
executive positions with other firms but a lower 
proportion of outside directors on the committee. 
Based on prior CEO/director remuneration research, 
Table 6 findings suggest firms having remuneration 
committee comprised on members with their 
interests better aligned with the firm’s shareholders 
were more likely to pay attention to the incremental 
value of ICE measurement in determining the cash-
based bonus payments to executive directors. 
Furthermore, Table 6 results suggest firms with 
remuneration committees that are not under as much 
scrutiny and pressure from managerial power were 
more likely to have consider the incremental value 
of intellectual capital performance in determining 
the appropriate compensation of executive directors. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Future 
Research Ideas 
 
The primary purpose of the paper is to investigate 
the association between intellectual capital 
performance and the proportion of cash-based bonus 
payments. The role and responsibility for determine 
the compensation of executive directors falling to 
the hands of the remuneration committee. 
Consequently, using a joint optimal contract pricing 
– managerial power framework we extend the 
analysis to examine if remuneration committee 
characteristics may influence any intellectual capital 
performance – cash-based bonus payments linkage. 
Our study contributes to the corporate governance 
literature being the first to empirically examine 
whether firms were likely to see any incremental 
value in using intellectual capital performance as an 
additional measure beyond stock prices as a means 
for determining cash-based bonuses for executive 
directors. We further contribute to this literature 
being one of the first studies to have considered the 
possible features of the remuneration committee that 
may affect its decision making process when 
determining remuneration packages for executive 
directors. Finally, we also add to the intellectual 
capital literature by conducting one of the first 
empirical studies outside of the two major streams 
that have dominated this discipline during its initial 
evolutionary development. The approach our study 
adopts can head build further foundations for 
extending current intellectual capital research in 
new directions so as to enhance greater 
understanding. Our analysis draws on intellectual 
capital performance and remuneration committee 
data hand collected from 354 Singapore publicly 
listed companies. From these firms we were able to 
collate remuneration package related information 
for 964 executive directors. All data collected is for 
the 2003 fiscal year. Using an OLS pooled-sample 
regressions approach we a positive and significant 
association between intellectual capital performance 
and the proportion of cash-based bonus payments to 
non-contingent payments for executive directors. 
This result supports our proposition that firms are 
likely to see incremental value in using intellectual 
capital performance measures to complement 
existing stock price measures in determining cash-
based bonus payments to executive directors. Latent 
class analysis, however, indicates that the positive 
intellectual capital performance – cash-based bonus 
payment linkage does not extend to the entire 
sample. Specifically, latent class analysis infers 
firms where the interests of the remuneration 
committee members are not as closely aligned with 
those of shareholders and/or where managerial 
power enables corporate executive to determine in 
part their remuneration packages the 
aforementioned positive linkages is actually 
negative. Results from latent class analysis, 
therefore, suggest remuneration committee features 
influence the intellectual capital performance – 
cash-based bonus payment linkage. 
There are several limitations of our study that 
provides avenues for further investigation. First, our 
study focuses on only a single remuneration 
mechanism. This may limit the ability to generalize 
our findings to encompass other component of an 
executive director’s total remuneration in other 
domestic setting. In the United States, for example, 
equity-based incentives dominate the remuneration 
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structure of executives rather than the cash-based 
bonus payment. As cash-based bonus payments and 
equity-based incentives are similar in that they are 
contingent on performance, future research will 
assist in clarifying more clearly the extent of the 
association between intellectual capital performance 
and executive director remuneration. Second, due to 
data limitations and metric constraints we have 
relied on a composite measure of intellectual capital 
performance. Classification studies of intellectual 
capital, however, clearly highlight the general 
consensus that this discipline is multi-dimensional 
such that a metric measuring this phenomenon 
should be reflective of each element. Use of a 
composite metric restricts our ability to determine 
or predict which element of intellectual capital may 
be the pivotal factor driving the association with 
executive director remuneration. Additional insights 
may be forthcoming if future research focuses on 
specific aspects of intellectual capital rather than 
presuming a totalitarian association with 
remuneration. This could be achieved by examining 
a smaller sample from a specific industry. Third, we 
merely document an association between 
intellectual capital performance and an executive 
director’s cash-based bonus payments, and the 
mitigating influences of remuneration committee 
characteristics. Our empirical evidence, however, 
does not explicitly imply that measures of 
intellectual capital performance are formally used in 
remuneration contracts. Hence, we cannot formally 
rule out the possibility our proxy measure is 
correlated with other subjective measures actually 
used in remuneration contracts. When sufficient 
disclosure becomes available future research our 
analysis can be conducted again to determine the 
validity of our findings. Finally, our study focuses 
on a time period unique to Singapore publicly listed 
companies in being the first year in which more 
extensive remuneration transparency was required. 
Thus, our results may be time-period specific and 
does not consider potential changes in remuneration 
contracts across time. Such a focus is beyond the 
scope of our study though the timeliness of our 
research provides a valuable contribution to policy 
makers. Overall, a longitudinal analysis is a fertile 
area for future research. 
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Endnotes 
1. Apart from cash-based bonus payments it is also possible to have focused on equity-based incentive payments or other 
long-term incentive initiatives. In Singapore during 2003 equity-based incentive compensation was not readily used by 
firms and the quality of disclosure was quite limited preventing the ability to make a valid calculation of the value of 
stock options issued. Also, remuneration disclosure by Singapore publicly listed firms did not divide compensation into 
long-term or short-term incentive payments as provided by United States firms. As cash-based bonus payments appears to 
be the largest form of incentive payments in Singapore and disclosure on this component is frequently provided we 
concentrate on this form of payment. 
2. Growth in the magnitude of executive remuneration and incentive based pay mechanisms is likely to be more 
pronounced in the United States this phenomenon has occurred in other domestic setting such as Australia, New Zealand 
and United Kingdom. These trends internationally a likely to continue as corporate governance advocates and government 
(such as in Singapore) intensify calls for firms to pay a higher proportion of executive compensation based on 
performance rather then non-contingent factors. 
3. We adopt this approach because few (if any) companies explicitly state whether intellectual capital performance 
measures are used in determining remuneration of executive directors. Thus, to enable the analysis to draw data from a 
reasonable sized sample to perform statistical analysis we assume firms use such metrics.  
4. The specific bands were: (1) SGD$250,000 and below; (2) between SGD$250,000 and SGD$499,999; and (3) 
SGD$500,000 and above. There were no specific requirements to disclose remuneration by executive director or non-
executive. Nonetheless, a small group of firms routinely provided this segregation. Voluntary compensation disclosures 
beyond the aforementioned mandatory requirements are practically non-existent. The calendar year 2003, therefore, 
represents the first year for which any meaningful compensation data is available to enable any form of statistical 
analysis. 
5. We acknowledge Singapore firms are not required to disclose if bonuses are purely tied directly to either accounting or 
market values of firm performance. Nonetheless, for purposes of our study we presume that such bonuses are a function 
of accounting or market value measures. 
6. We also developed a second proxy (hereafter Ratio_Incentive_Fixed) defined as the percentage of bonus compensation 
to executive director j as disclosed by Singapore firm k in their 2003 annual reports to measure the dependent variable. 
Regression results using the second proxy measure were qualitatively similar to those using the first proxy measure, 
though significance of relationships between the independent and dependent variable is slightly stronger than reported in 
the main results. Preferring to yield on the side of caution we report the main results based on Prop_Incentive_Pay proxy. 
7. Prior research has defined VA by the following algebraic equation: Rev – B + Inv = W + I + DP + D + T + M + R   or S 
– B + Inv – DP = W + I + DP + D + T + M + R. The former is commonly referred to as the gross VA and the latter is 
termed the net VA. Theoretical arguments have been forwarded supporting both approaches. Empirical research indicates 
both methods have been used in practices. Pulic (1998) argues that because of the central active role human resources 
plays in the value creation process labour costs (wages expense) should not be included in VA computations. This view is 
consistent with the opinions of other IC experts (Edvinsson 1997; Sveiby, 2000). 
8. This relationship can be defined as follows: (a) if VA by a firm’s IC its entirely attributed to human capital, the VA by 
structural capital would be zero; (b) if 50% of the value of the firm’s IC is attributed to human capital the remaining 50% 
is contributed by structural capital; and (c) if human capital contributes nothing to VA then all of the VA by the firm’s IC 
base would be attributed entirely to structural capital. 
9. For a full discussion on this joint framework see Conyon and He (2004). 
10. For many Singapore publicly listed firms the position of chief executive officer is not used. Rather, the senior 
executive position is commonly the managing director. For our study the roles of chief executive officer and managing 
director are considered comparable.  
11. A government-linked organization is a firm having the government’s investment arm (Temask Holdings Private 
Limited) as a substantial shareholder (five percent or more of the common outstanding shares). 
12. Whilst high ownership concentration in Singapore is lower than found in the United States and United Kingdom, it is 
a common characteristic in Asia nations.  
13. The Stock Exchange of Singapore has two further boards (or mechanisms) (known as the SGX Xtranet and Clob 
International) through which equity instruments are traded. 
14. Some firms, whilst officially listed on the SGX, did not produce 2003 annual reports as they had only just listed (that 
is, in November or December 2003) or were currently in receivership. 
15. Our statistical tests are not influenced by the retention or removal of outliers. However, the explanatory power of 
models tested is lower if the outlier data points are retained. 
16. The full correlation matrix is not tabulated due to brevity. 
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17. As a further check for multicollinearity we perform the model estimations reported in Table 6 and 7 again after first 
excluding ROI and then Losses. The independent exclusion of each respective control variable does not significant alter 
the findings reported in the main text. 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Table 1. Variables definitions and descriptions 
 
Variable Description Variable Title 
Dependent  Variables  
Ratio of executive director’s remuneration paid in accounting or market based performance bonuses 
to proportion paid in non-contingent salary. 
Prop_Incentive_Pay 
Control Variables  
The number of years the executive director has sat on the board of directors of firm i. Tenure 
Indicator variable where the executive director of firm i is scored one(1) if also a founder of firm i; 
otherwise a score of zero (0). 
Founder 
Indicator variable where the executive director of firm i is scored one if the executive director is not a 
founder of firm i but is a family member of the founding family; otherwise a score of zero (0). 
Family 
Number of individuals serving on the board of firm i as at the end of year t-. BoD_Size 
Percentage of the board of directors of firm i comprised of independent directors at the end of year t-. BoD_Independence 
Indicator variable with firms having same individual occupying the roles of Chairperson and CEO 
jointly being scored a value of one (1); otherwise firms are scored a value of zero (0). 
Duality 
Percentage of outstanding common shares of firm i owned by executive directors on the board of 
directors of firm i at the end of year t-. 
%_Exe_Dir_Own 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if it is a government linked entity; otherwise scored zero 
(0). 
GLC 
Percentage of outstanding common shares owned by top twenty shareholders of firm i for year t-. OwnCon% 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if their incumbent auditor in fiscal year t- is a Big-4 firm; 
otherwise scored zero (0). 
Big-4 
Natural logarithm of number of days since first time auditor appointed to day auditor’s report for firm 
i in year t- signed. 
Ln(Aud-Tenure) 
Absolute discretionary accruals for firm i for year t- measured by the modified-Jones (1991) model. AbsDAC 
Natural logarithm of the total book reported assets of firm i for their fiscal year t-1. Ln(Total Assets) 
Natural logarithm of number of days since the date of incorporation for firm i. Ln(Age) 
Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items of firm i for year t- to book value total assets of firm i 
for year t-1. 
ROI 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if it has occurred a financial loss at least once in the three 
prior fiscal years; otherwise scored zero (0). 
Losses 
Natural logarithm of one (1) plus the stock return of firm i during year t-. StockRet 
Ratio of book value total debt of firm i for year t- to book value total assets of firm i for year t-1. Leverage 
Ratio of firm i’s market value to book value of total assets MVTotalAssets 
Natural logarithm of number of employees of firm i in year t- signed. Ln(No. Employees) 
Indicator variable with firm i scored one (1) if from the manufacturing industry; otherwise scored 
zero (0). 
IndMan 
Remuneration Committee Features  
Indicator variable where firm i is scored one (1) if a member of the remuneration committee is a 
substantial shareholder (i.e., holds 5% or more of the common outstanding stock) of firm i; otherwise 
scored zero (0) 
SignOwner 
Indicator variable where firm i is scored one (1) if all members of the remuneration committee also 
form the membership for the audit and nomination committees; otherwise scored zero (0). 
AllSame 
Proportion of the remuneration committee members with an accounting or legal education and related 
work background. 
RCAccLegal 
Number of meetings held by the remuneration committee of firm i during year t-. RCDiligence 
Percentage of the remuneration committee of firm i defined as independent directors at the end of 
year t-. 
RC_Independence 
Indicator variable where firms having a senior executive (i.e., executive chairman, CEO or managing 
director) of another firm sitting on the remuneration committee at the end of year t- being scored a 
value of one (1); otherwise firms are scored a value of zero (0). 
Snr_Exe_Presence 
Number of individuals serving on the remuneration committee of firm i as at the end of year t-. RC Size 
Independent Variable  
Sum of the human capital coefficient and structural capital coefficient calculated from the VAIC™ 
methodology for firm i during the year t-. 
ICE 
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Table 2. Sample used in analysis and industry breakdown 
 
Description of selection process: Number 
Firms listed on SGX (Mainboard and Sesdaq) as at December 31, 2003 551 
Less: Firms listed on SGX that did not issue annual report during 2003 calendar period 20 
Foreign incorporated firms listed on SGX as at December 31, 2003 63 
Bank and Insurance industry firms listed on SGX as at December 31, 2003 11 
Firms that were IPOs during the 2003 calendar year 55 
Firms producing 2003 calendar year annual reports BUT collectible  10 
Firms with inadequate executive director remuneration disclosures 11 
Firms without a remuneration committee 12 
Firms with incomplete corporate governance data to calculate experimental proxies 5 
Firms with insufficient information for which to construct all proxy measures 9 
Outliers 3 
Final sample used 354 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics (Dependent, independent and control variables are in italics) 
 
 Mean/Percent∞ Std. Dev. Median P’tile 25 P’tile 75 
Dependent Variable Characteristicsβ      
$500,000 and Above 21.37     
$250,000 - $499,000 36.31     
$250,000 and Below 42.53     
Prop_Incentive_Pay 33.33 62.73 9.02 0.00 37.50 
Independent Variable      
ICE 1.31 2.48 1.03 -0.42 2.64 
Remuneration Committee Characteristicsβ      
SignOwner 63.24     
AllSame 23.49     
RCAccLegal 45.20 50.00 29.97 20.00 60.00 
RC_Independence 69.23 14.42 66.67 66.67 66.67 
Snr_Exe_Presence 17.22     
RCSize 3.32 0.64 3.00 3.00 3.00 
RCDiligence 1.23 1.07 1.00 1.00 2.00 
Control Variable Characteristicsα      
Tenure 5.91 3.92 6.11 3.18 9.45 
Founder 38.72     
Family 23.41     
BoD_Size 7.34 1.83 7.00 6.00 8.00 
BoD_Independence 41.69 10.72 40.00 33.33 50.00 
%_Exe_Owners 18.40 21.59 8.30 0.79 30.36 
Duality 29.25     
Top_20 78.45 10.70 79.94 71.11 86.56 
GLC 10.73     
Big-4 86.23     
Ln(Aud_Tenure) 6.57 0.65 6.68 6.10 7.05 
AbsDac 0.08 0.79 0.03 -0.35 0.48 
Total Assets (SGD$'000) 2,037,090.31 13,325,265.9 95,438.00 40,805.00 222,431.00 
Ln(TotalAssets) 18.63 1.61 18.37 17.52 19.22 
Ln(Age) 7.55 1.20 7.67 7.12 8.19 
ROI 2.23 8.42 2.85 -0.39 6.96 
Losses 26.56     
StockRet 0.73 2.92 -0.57 -0.11 1.05 
Leverage 21.17 16.73 18.47 6.16 34.29 
MVTotalAssets 1.3312 0.7572 1.4243 0.5488 1.5771 
No. Employees 1448.01 2896.95 466.00 175.50 1211.00 
Ln(No. Employees) 6.21 1.40 6.14 5.17 7.10 
IndMan 40.46     
Where: ∞ - for continuous scale variables the mean is shown, whilst for dichotomous scale variable the percentage of 
the sample with the defined characteristic is shown; β – Dependent and independent variable descriptive statistics are 
based on total number of executive directors (i.e., 964) covered in the study; and α – Control variable descriptive statistics 
are based on the number of firms included in the study (i.e., 304). See Table 2 for formal definitions of the dependent, 
experimental and control variables. 
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Table 4. Pearson (Spearman) correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables 
 Prop_ 
Incentive
_Pay 
ICE SignOwner AllSame 
RCAccLe
gal 
RC_ 
Independ
ence 
Snr_Exe_ 
Presence RCSize 
RCDilige
nce 
Prop_Incentiv
e_Pay 
 0.143* -0.072 -0.179* 0.108** 0.238* -0.134* -0.091** 0.201* 
ICE 0.123*  0.065 0.219* 0.074** -0.036 0.043 -0.002 0.128* 
SignOwner -0.050 0.040  -0.051 0.039 0.010 -0.004 0.042 -0.001 
AllSame -0.183* 0.208* -0.051  0.161* 0.399* -0.116** -0.196* -0.124* 
RCAccLegal 0.073 0.126* 0.051 0.161*  0.043 0.064 -0.111** -0.037 
RC_Independ
ence 
0.181* -0.054 0.087 0.359* 0.020  -0.198* -0.165* -0.003 
Snr_Exe_Pres
ence 
-0.150* 0.038 -0.004 -0.116 0.071 -0.147*  0.102** 0.030 
RCSize -0.103** 0.026 0.100** -0.207* -0.115** -0.083 0.105**  0.064 
RCDiligence 0.229* 0.078** -0.009 -0.121* -0.054 0.042 0.040 0.014  
Where: * = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.01, two-sided; and 
** = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.05, one-sided. 
 
Table 5. OLS regression results for pooled-sample (N – 964) 
 Model A Model B Model C 
 OLS Est. t-stat. OLS Est. t-stat. OLS Est. t-stat. 
(Constant)  6.791*  7.425*  8.271* 
Tenure 0.032 1.056 0.042 1.390 0.030 0.965 
Founder -0.042 -1.432 -0.018 -0.608 -0.035 -1.226 
Family 0.014 0.518 0.018 0.656 0.022 0.814 
BoDSize 0.060 1.601 0.045 1.105 0.047 1.172 
BoDIndependence 0.029 0.872 -0.017 -0.492 -0.040 -1.143 
%_Exe_Owners -0.080 -2.684* -0.074 -2.477* -0.079 -2.686* 
Duality 0.066 2.374* 0.061 1.993** 0.062 2.061** 
Top_20 0.016 0.559 0.037 1.219 0.040 1.363 
GLC -0.036 -1.175 -0.026 -0.857 -0.028 -0.940 
Big-4 -0.026 -0.955 -0.014 -0.492 -0.011 -0.409 
Ln(Aud_Tenure) 0.040 1.454 0.046 1.642** 0.046 1.655** 
AbsDac -0.024 -0.780 -0.013 -0.409 -0.043 -1.384 
Ln(TotalAssets) 0.412 7.393* 0.434 7.677* 0.454 8.161* 
Ln(Age) -0.195 -5.504* -0.185 -5.070* -0.184 -5.118* 
ROI 0.185 3.690* 0.227 4.558* 0.181 3.646* 
Losses -0.084 -1.812** -0.062 -1.330 -0.078 -1.716** 
Leverage -0.033 -1.032 -0.037 -1.125 -0.029 -0.877 
MVTotalAssets 0.048 1.571 0.050 1.630 0.060 2.027** 
Ln(No. Employees) -0.003 -0.074 -0.024 -0.538 -0.029 -0.677 
IndMan 0.089 2.798* 0.108 3.364* 0.096 3.035* 
SignOwner   -0.041 -1.354 -0.042 -1.341 
AllSame   -0.076 -2.536* -0.099 -2.977* 
RCAccLegal   0.014 0.455 -0.034 -0.667 
RCDiligence   0.143 3.418* 0.097 3.114* 
Snr_Exe_Presence   -0.056 -1.865** -0.064 -1.999** 
RCSize   -0.023 -0.825 -0.27 -1.021 
RC_Independence   0.166 5.785* 0.153 4.354* 
ICE     0.064 2.008** 
Model Summary    
Adjusted R-Square 0.349 0.377 0.380 
F-statistic 20.978* 19.422* 18.832* 
Where: * = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.01, one-sided, except for the intercept at two-sided; and 
** = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.05, one-sided. 
See Table 2 for formal definitions of the dependent, experimental and control variables. 
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Table 6. Latent class mixture regression analysis results 
Panel A: Cluster Regression Results Based on Equation 8 
 Cluster  
 I II III IV  
(Constant) 10.678* 12.965* 5.697* 9.663*  
ICE 2.761* -4.317* 0.518 0.865  
% Sample 30.498 48.755 9.959 10.788  
Panel B: ANOVA Results of Remuneration Committee Characteristics per Cluster 
 Cluster  
 I II III IV F-Statistic 
SignOwner 0.229 0.154 0.170 0.163 0.868 
AllSame 0.048 0.271 0.174 0.077 15.197* 
RCAccLegal 0.081 0.109 0.077 0.162 13.147* 
RCDiligence 1.423 1.249 1.021 1.204 2.440 
Snr_Exe_Presence 0.163 0.269 0.188 0.153 2.807** 
RCSize 3.265 3.357 3.146 3.423 4.629* 
RC_Independence 0.712 0.651 0.707 0.703 11.823* 
Where: * = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.01, one-sided, except for the intercept at two-sided; and 
** = coefficient significant at the p ≤ 0.05, one-sided. 
See Table 2 for formal definitions of the dependent, experimental and control variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
